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ABSTRACT: Art. 50 TEU has been criticised because it allegedly grants EU Member States an unfet-
tered right to unilateral secession, which questions the EU’s quasi-federal character and fosters its 
disintegration. This On the Agenda demonstrates that this widespread pessimism is unjustified, 
since it is based on an exceedingly formalistic reading of the law. Secession (from States) and with-
drawal (from international organisations) is always possible de facto: the relevant question is 
whether constitutional provisions ensure an orderly secession and discourage casual recourse 
thereto. Art. 50 TEU arguably constitutes a “well-designed secession clause”, since it ensures the 
EU’s unity in withdrawal negotiations, limits the discretion of the departing State regarding the ac-
tivation and termination of the withdrawal procedure, and induces it to reach a compromise with 
the Union. Art. 50 thus ensures a fair balance between the concern for the EU’s integrity and the 
democratic and federal principles that inspire it. 
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I. Introduction 
Withdrawal from the EU has long been a matter of legal debate, and has drawn particu-
lar attention after the Brexit referendum. The exit of an EU Member State raises nu-
merous legal questions concerning issues such as the options available to the departing 
 
* Research Associate, University of Luxembourg, mauro.gatti@uni.lu. I thank Jeremy Bierbach, Carlos 
Closa, Giulia Evolvi, Eleftheria Neframi, Pietro Manzini, and Carlo Tovo for their comments. The usual dis-
claimer applies. 
160 Mauro Gatti 
State after withdrawal,1 the judicial settlement of withdrawal-related disputes,2 or the 
procedure for withdrawal, set in Art. 50 TEU. The latter is an especially crucial problem, 
which remains under researched. 
Art. 50 TEU attracted significant criticism, because it is allegedly vague3 and explicit-
ly recognises the right of EU Member States to unilaterally withdraw from the Union. 
Pursuant to this provision, “any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union”, 
by notifying its intention to do so and either negotiating “arrangements for its with-
drawal” or waiting for two years. The possibility of unilateral withdrawal is theoretically 
problematic because it allegedly contradicts the integrationist rationale of the Treaties4 
and questions its (quasi-)federal nature.5 While unilateral withdrawal is perfectly con-
ceivable in the context of international organisations, unilateral secession from federa-
tions is generally excluded.6 The right to unilateral withdrawal from the EU might pur-
portedly have negative practical consequences. By giving EU members “an unfettered 
right to unilateral withdrawal”,7 Art. 50 seems to ensure “State primacy” throughout the 
withdrawal procedure, enabling EU members to “control the process of withdrawal to 
their own benefit”.8 Art. 50 may therefore result in some sort of “regressive, gradual dis-
integration of the EU”.9 
 
1 See H.P. GRAVER, Possibilities and Challenges of the EEA as an Option for the UK After Brexit, in Eu-
ropean Papers, 2016, Vol. 1, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 803 et seq.; P. MANZINI, In caso di Brexit, in 
Eurojus, 14 June 2016, rivista.eurojus.it. 
2 See e.g. F. CASOLARI, Il labirinto delle linee rosse, ovvero: chi giudicherà la Brexit?, in SidiBlog, 27 
April 2017, www.sidiblog.org. 
3 J. FRIEL, Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft 
European Constitution, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2004, p. 426; H. HOFMEISTER, 
“Should I Stay or Should I Go?”. A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, in European Law 
Journal, 2010, pp. 594-595; S. WIEDUWILT, Article 50 TEU. The Legal Framework of a Withdrawal from the 
European Union, in ZEuS Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, 2015, pp. 195-196. 
4 P. ATHANASSIOU, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, in European 
Central Bank Legal Working Paper Series, no. 10, 2009, p. 25. 
5 The ideas of federalism and federation are of course polysemic, see e.g. M. CLAES, M. DE VISSER, The 
Court of Justice as a Federal Constitutional Court: A Comparative Perspective, in E. CLOOTS, G. DE BAERE, S. 
SOTTIAUX (eds), Federalism in the European Union, Oxford: Hart, 2012, pp. 83-85; R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to 
Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Suffice to say that the present contribution elucidates some similarities and differences between EU law 
and the law of some federal States in respect of secession/withdrawal. 
6 See infra, section II. 
7 H. HOFMEISTER, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”, cit., p. 592. See also J. FRIEL, Providing a Constitutional 
Framework, cit., pp. 424-427; J. HERBST, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: 
Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”?, in German Law Journal, 2006, pp. 1758-1760; A.F. TATHAM, “Don’t 
Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!”: EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon, in A. BIONDI, P. 
EECKHOUT (eds), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 152 et seq. 
8 J. FRIEL, Providing a Constitutional Framework, cit., p. 426. See also A.F. TATHAM, “Don’t Mention Di-
vorce at the Wedding”, cit., pp. 151-152. 
9 H. HOFMEISTER, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”, cit., p. 599. 
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Arguably, these criticisms are not well founded. Art. 50 TEU does not recognise an 
unfettered right to unilateral withdrawal, but introduces an important limitation to uni-
lateralism: the obligation to follow a rigorous procedure.10 By subjecting withdrawal to 
strict procedural conditions, Art. 50 TEU is likely to encourage the departing State to co-
operate and to compromise.11 Therefore, it is submitted – contrary to a widespread 
view – that Art. 50 constitutes a “well-designed secession clause”,12 which discourages 
casual recourse to withdrawal from the EU. Instead of contradicting the integrationist 
rationale of the Treaties, Art. 50 may ensure an orderly withdrawal process and con-
tribute to remedy the EU’s democratic deficit. By providing for a systemic analysis of Art. 
50 TEU, this On the Agenda contributes to the debate on the identity of the Union as a 
sui generis subject, and provides insight into the impact that Art. 50 TEU may have in 
practice. It is worth noting that this On the Agenda focuses on a specific aspect relating 
to the withdrawal from the EU – the right to unilateral withdrawal – and does not seek 
to exhaustively chart the developments concerning the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It 
is also worth stressing that the On the Agenda focuses on the law as it stands, not on its 
historical evolution, and does not purport to verify whether the effects of Art. 50 were 
intended by its drafters. 
The On the Agenda is divided in six sections. Section II introduces the concepts of 
unilateral secession (from States) and withdrawal (from international organisations). 
Section III shows that, while Art. 50 allows for unilateral withdrawal, it does not neces-
sarily question the rationale of European integration: more important than the abstract 
possibility to “secede” are the procedural restrictions to secession. The On the Agenda 
then demonstrates that Art. 50 fosters an orderly withdrawal process and discourages 
“secession” from the EU, in three ways. Firstly, Art. 50 ensures the unity of the EU during 
withdrawal negotiations (section IV). Secondly, Art. 50 restrains the discretion of depart-
ing States regarding the activation and termination of the withdrawal procedure (sec-
tion V). Thirdly, it is contended that the very concept of unilateral withdrawal under Art. 
50 is better understood as a risk for the withdrawing country, rather than as a right that 
the withdrawing State may exploit (section VI). The theoretical and practical impact of 
Art. 50 TEU on the process of European integration are discussed in the conclusion (sec-
tion VII). 
 
10 Cf. C. CLOSA, Interpreting Article 50: Exit and Voice and…What about Loyalty, in EUI Working Papers, 
no. 71, 2016, p. 5. 
11 Cf. S. MANCINI, Secession and Self-Determination, in M. ROSENFELD, A. SAJÒ (eds), The Oxford Hand-
book of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 495. 
12 This definition is borrowed from W. NORMAN, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism 
and Secession in the Multinational State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 175; see further infra, 
section III. 
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II. The problem of unilateral secession and withdrawal 
The debate on the constitutional identity of the EU often addresses the analogy be-
tween the Union, on the one hand, and international organisations and States, on the 
other hand. The rules on the withdrawal from the EU may provide for an important ar-
gument in this debate, as the founding treaties of international organisations and 
States' constitutions address this issue in a different manner. 
Consensual withdrawal (from international organisation) and secession (from 
States) are not exceedingly problematic. Art. 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (hereinafter, 1969 Vienna Convention) expressly enables States to withdraw 
from a treaty (such as the founding treaty of an international organisation) whenever 
they obtain the “consent of all the parties”. Similarly, international law seems to enable 
a province to secede from a State by reaching an agreement with the latter. The princi-
ple of self-determination suggests that, in international law terms, provinces have a 
right “to resolve their future status through free negotiation” with their State.13 The 
constitutional law of certain States appears to hinder consensual secession, since it pos-
tulates the indivisibility of the country.14 Nonetheless, it is clear that at least certain 
States – notably federations and devolved States – expressly recognise the right to con-
sensual secession of all or some of their territories.15 For instance, the Constitution of 
Ethiopia acknowledges that “every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an un-
conditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”, coming into ef-
fect “when the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the council of 
the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede”.16 Similarly, the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985 stipulates that, if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly 
wish for the establishment of a united Ireland, the parties will introduce legislation to 
give effect to that wish.17 The right to secession may not be spelled out in the law, but 
nonetheless be recognised in the case-law. The Supreme Court of Canada, in particular, 
acknowledged the right of provinces to “seek” independence, provided that they demo-
cratically decide to secede and negotiate secession with the federation and the other 
 
13 UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, written answer to Lord Hylton, in UK Par-
liament, Hansard Report, Written Answers (Lords) of 23 January 1991, hansard.millbanksystems.com. See 
also J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 
394-395. 
14 E.g. Croatia, France, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, see W. NORMAN, Negotiating Nationalism, cit., 
pp. 124-126. 
15 See also P. RADAN, Secession in Constitutional Law, in A. PAVKOVIC, P. RADAN (eds), The Ashgate Re-
search Companion to Secession, Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, p. 333 et seq. 
16 Art. 39, para. 1, of the Constitution of Ethiopia. 
17 Art. 1 of the Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United 
Kingdom, concluded on 15 November 1985. 
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provinces.18 The regulation of secession is evidently not uniform in these three cases; 
nonetheless, these examples demonstrate that, in some situations, consensual seces-
sion from States may be possible. 
Unilateral withdrawal and secession, i.e. withdrawal and secession that are not the 
product of a negotiation,19 are more problematic. Unilateral withdrawal from interna-
tional organisations is possible when it is expressly allowed by the statute of an interna-
tional organisation.20 For example, Art. XV of the WTO agreement enables a Member 
State to unilaterally withdraw upon the expiration of six months from the date on which 
the State has given notice of withdrawal to the organisation. Similarly, Art. 1 of the 
League of Nations’ Covenant stipulated that any Member State could, after two years’ 
notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League.21 Under Art. 56, para. 1, of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention, withdrawal from an international organisation is possible 
even if it is not explicitly foreseen in its statute, provided that: it is established that the 
parties intended to admit the possibility of withdrawal (Art. 56, para. 1, let. a)), or a right 
of unilateral withdrawal is “implied by the nature of the treaty” founding the organisa-
tion (Art. 56, para. 1, let. b)). According to some authors, it may be presumed that the 
nature of the treaties establishing international organisations generally implies the right 
to unilateral withdrawal. In principle, “anything which is not conceded in favour of the 
international organisation is retained by the Member State”;22 in the absence of an ex-
press stipulation, it may be presumed that the international organisation does not put 
any limitation on the right of the Member States to withdraw.23 It should be noted, at 
any rate, that the practice in this respect is not straightforward.24 
While unilateral withdrawal from international organisations seems often possible, 
unilateral secession from States encounters several obstacles. International law ap-
pears to be neutral with respect to unilateral secession. There generally is neither a 
right to unilateral secession by parts of independent States25 nor a prohibition of such a 
 
18 Supreme Court of Canada, judgment of 20 August 1998, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 
2 S.C.R. 217, para. 82. 
19 On the definition of unilateral secession, see ibid., para. 86. 
20 See Art. 54 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, cit. 
21 Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted on 28 April 1919. 
22 N. SINGH, Termination of Membership of International Organisations, Southwark: Stevens & Sons, 
1958, p. 80. 
23 Ibid.; see further R.A. WESSEL, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But Can You Really Leave? On ‘Brex-
it’ and Leaving International Organizations, in International Organizations Law Review, 2016, pp. 201-205. 
24 See T. CHRISTAKIS, Article 56, 1969 Vienna Convention, in O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN (eds), The Vienna Conventions 
on the Law of the Treaties: A Commentary, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 1275. 
25 J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States, cit., p. 415. The colonial context constitutes an exception to 
this general rule. Furthermore, a right to secession may allegedly be the last resort for ending oppression 
(so-called remedial secession), but it is doubtful whether such a right actually exists, see inter alia J. 
VIDMAR, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, in St. Antony’s Interna-
tional Review, 2010, p. 37 et seq. 
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secession.26 The principle of territorial integrity of States may potentially be questioned 
by unilateral secession, but, as noted by the International Court of Justice, the “scope of 
the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between 
states”,27 and does not address non-State entities such as separatist groups. One 
should note, in any event, that a State constituted through unilateral secession is unlike-
ly to receive wide recognition in the international community;28 hence, the ultimate suc-
cess of such a secession may be at risk.29 Domestic laws are more hostile to unilateral 
secession from States.30 Even the States that acknowledge the possibility of secession 
usually subordinate it to some action of the original State, e.g. transferral of power (e.g. 
Ethiopia), the adoption of a law (e.g. United Kingdom), or the conclusion of an arrange-
ment with the breakaway province (e.g. Canada).31 The original State must be involved 
in the secession procedure because, as noted by the Canadian Supreme Court, States 
are characterised by “close ties of interdependence” based on shared values, which 
would be put into question by unilateral secession.32 Some form of negotiation be-
tween the State and the separatist entity is required to address the interests of the en-
tire country and of its citizens.33 
Unilateral secession, therefore, seems to set international organisations apart from 
States: while unilateral withdrawal is often possible in the case of international organi-
sations, it is generally impossible in the case of States, including federations. Conse-
quently, the possibility to dissolve an entity “only by mutual agreement” is sometimes 
taken as an indicator of its statehood.34 
III. Does the right to unilateral secession/withdrawal matter? 
Given the different regulation of unilateral secession in international organisations and 
States, one may be tempted to assess the constitutional identity of the European Union 
by verifying whether its Member States have a right to unilateral withdrawal. 
 
26 T. CHRISTAKIS, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about 
Secession?, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 73 et seq. 
27 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 81. 
28 Cf. J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States, cit., p. 414. 
29 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, cit. 
30 An exception is provided by the Constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, whose Art. 113 gives Nevis 
the right to unilateral secession. 
31 See supra, footnotes 16-19. 
32 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 149. Cf. H. DE WAELE, The 
Secession Conundrum – Through the Looking Glass, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2015, p. 614. 
33 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 151. 
34 R.L. WATTS, Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships, in D. KARMIS, W. NORMA (eds), Theories of 
Federalism: A Reader, London: Palgrave, 2005, p. 235. 
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Before the Lisbon reform, the issue was unclear, since EEC/EU Treaties were silent 
on this topic. In principle, one may potentially argue that unilateral withdrawal from the 
EEC/EU was possible under Art. 56, para. 1, let. b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention, given 
the EEC/EU’s character as an international organisation (see above, section II).35 Howev-
er, it seems more reasonable to regard unilateral withdrawal from the EEC/EU as illegit-
imate, because it contradicted the nature of the EU as an organisation based on “obliga-
tions undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by Member States”.36 It is not possible 
to reach definitive conclusions, in any event, because no Member State ever sought 
withdrawal from the European Communities. 
The European Constitution and, then, the Lisbon Treaty, introduced a withdrawal 
clause, in what is now Art. 50 TEU. This provision was first proposed by the European 
Convention Praesidium, reportedly to fight anti-EU media propaganda in the UK. As 
noted by Brian Kerr, a British member of the Praesidium, “we wanted to defuse the ca-
nard that you are tied to the EU, with no way out, proceeding to an unknown destina-
tion”.37 Art. 50 TEU provides for the right to unilateral withdrawal from the EU because 
it expressly stipulates that a Member State may autonomously leave the Union by noti-
fying the European Council of its intention and either concluding a “withdrawal agree-
ment” with the Union or waiting for “two years after the notification”. 
The existence of an explicit right to unilateral withdraw from the European Union 
might potentially be regarded as evidence for the thesis that the EU is not a State38 and 
that its (quasi-)federal character is questioned. In fact, certain pro-EU members of the 
European Convention complained that the right to withdrawal confirmed the EU’s char-
acter as a traditional international organisation.39 Even the representatives of some 
Member States criticised this provision at first.40 Conversely, less EU-enthusiastic com-
mentators praised Art. 50 TEU. The German Constitutional Court, in particular, noted 
that Art. 50 TEU made explicit for the first time in primary law the existing right of each 
Member State to withdraw from the European Union. Therefore, according to that 
 
35 See, to that effect, German Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 
2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92. 
36 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 March 1978, case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, para 18. See further J. HILL, The European Economic Community: The Right of 
Member State Withdrawal, in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1982, p. 335 et seq. 
37 Quoted in A. MACDONALD, P. TAYLOR, Federalists Tried to Kill EU Exit Clause; Now Britain Wants to 
Dodge It, in Reuters, 28 June 2016, uk.reuters.com. 
38 T. LOCK, Why the European Union is Not a State, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, p. 414. 
39 Cf. Proposition d’amendement à l’Article: 46 – Déposée par Madame ou Monsieur: M. Louis Michel, 
M. Karel de Gucht, M. Elio di Rupo, Mme Anne Van Lancker, membres de la Convention et M. Pierre 
Chevalier et Mme Marie Nagy, membres suppléants de la Convention ainsi que par Monsieur Patrick 
Dewael, observateur, annexed Explication éventuelle, web.archive.org. 
40 The then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, for instance, declared that “this clause should 
be struck out. […] So far there has been no need for an exit provision for the Union”, quoted in A. 
MACDONALD, P. TAYLOR, Federalists Tried to Kill EU Exit Clause, cit. 
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Court, Art. 50 TEU “underlines the Member States’ sovereignty” and shows that the cur-
rent state of development of the European Union “does not transgress the boundary 
towards a state”.41 
Both the praise and the criticism for Art. 50 TEU are arguably too formalistic. While 
it is true that national constitutions generally prohibit unilateral secession, the absence 
of a right to unilateral secession does not render secession impossible. Numerous 
States, including several EU Members,42 were created through unilateral secession. Se-
cessions are indeed “ordinary events in international life”.43 As noted by the Canadian 
Supreme Court, “although under the Constitution there is no right to pursue secession 
unilaterally, […] this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration 
of secession leading to a de facto secession. The ultimate success of such a secession 
would be dependent on effective control of a territory and recognition by the interna-
tional community”.44 
Democratic constitutions may even stimulate secession, albeit indirectly. To appro-
priately respect the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association, demo-
cratic States must tolerate the advocacy of secession, the formation of parties with se-
cessionist platforms, and the participation of such parties in provincial governments.45 
Secessionists may therefore be in strong bargaining positions, which they might rein-
force by calling for referenda on independence. States can hardly prevent a provincial 
authority to hold a consultative referendum, and may find it difficult not to negotiate 
with the secessionists after their victory in that consultation. In fact, it is possible that a 
popular secessionist movement without a legal means to pursue its political agenda 
“may give rise to political uncertainty, and possibly worse (in some cases, the certainty 
of violence)”.46 
As unilateral secession is always possible de facto, the mere constitutional recogni-
tion of the right to secede is not necessarily decisive per se, and does not constitute 
conclusive evidence of the EU’s identity as a traditional international organisation. In-
stead of focusing on formalistic aspects, one should arguably verify whether constitu-
tional norms actually hinder or facilitate secession. It may be assumed that federations 
discourage recourse to secession to preserve their integrity. A traditional international or-
ganisation, on the contrary, is presumably neutral in respect of secession, since its exist-
 
41 German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 329. 
42 This is the case of Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. 
43 D. KOCHENOV, M. VAN DEN BRINK, Secessions from EU Member States: The Imperative of Union’s 
Neutrality, in European Papers, 2016, Vol. 1, No 1, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 72. 
44 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 106. See further P. RADAN, 
Secession in Constitutional Law, cit., pp. 341-342. 
45 W. NORMAN, Negotiating Nationalism, cit., p. 194. 
46 Ibid., p. 191. 
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ence depends on the will of its Member States. In other words, the question is not wheth-
er there is a right to unilateral secession, but rather how difficult secession might be. 
According to some authors, the two questions are correlated, since the mere exist-
ence of a right to secede “makes the move to ‘exit’ part of the normal game”,47 thereby 
increasing “the availability of the ultimate option”.48 Secession clauses allegedly create 
“dangers of blackmail”,49 since powerful provinces may threaten secession in order to 
obtain special conditions or privileges. These arguments are partially convincing, since 
secession clauses might indeed clarify the costs of exit, which may potentially be lower 
than the costs of continued membership in the original State. The constitutional recog-
nition of secession might reduce, in particular, the risk of civil war, thereby rendering 
secession less costly and more probable.50 
However, these arguments seem to ignore that secession is always part of the nor-
mal game, even when it is illegal. For instance, the prohibition of secession in the Span-
ish Constitution does not deter Catalan nationalists from pursuing secession. Since 
“everyone is aware that secession can occur regardless of its legal legitimacy”, as noted 
by Mancini, the constitutional prohibition of secession “does not necessarily prevent 
strong subunits from achieving a strong bargaining position” vis-à-vis their States.51 
Hence, blackmailing may potentially take place notwithstanding the illegitimacy of se-
cession: to pacify separatist movements, several States have had to provide sub-
national groups with a high degree of autonomy.52 Similar considerations apply, a forti-
ori, to the European Union. Long before the official acknowledgement of the right to 
withdraw from the EU, the UK held a referendum on the EEC membership (1975) and 
blackmailed the other Member States into providing special conditions (e.g. opt-outs) 
and privileges (e.g. the so-called UK rebate). 
Some authors have noted that secession clauses may have a beneficial effect for 
States because they can be engineered to increase the costs of exit and ensure an or-
derly withdrawal process. As noted by Weinstock, a secession clause may force seces-
sionists to make “a cold and lucid cost/benefit analysis of withdrawing versus remaining 
in the existing federation, that is, to consider seriously the legal obstacles that they 
must overcome before they can successfully secede”.53 A “well-designed secession 
clause”, as defined by Norman, should provide for clear procedural rules that ensure an 
 
47 H. ARONOVITCH, Seceding the Canadian Way, in Publius, 2006, p. 558. 
48 Ibid. 
49 C.R. SUNSTEIN, Constitutionalism and Secession, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1991, p. 633 
et seq.; see also C. CLOSA, Interpreting Article 50, cit., p. 17. 
50 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
51 S. MANCINI, Secession and Self-Determination, cit., p. 495. 
52 This is arguably the case, e.g., of India, Spain, and Belgium, as noted by D. HALBERSTAM, Federalism: 
Theory, Policy, Law, in M. ROSENFELD, A. SAJÒ (eds), The Oxford Handbook, cit., p. 583. 
53 D. WEINSTOCK, Toward a Proceduralist Theory of Secession, in Canadian Journal of Law and Juris-
prudence, 2000, p. 262 et seq. 
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orderly secession process and that enable the State to effectively defend its interests.54 
For instance, the clause may alert secessionists that they would be sitting across from 
“quite-possibly-hostile negotiators elected specially to represent the interests of the 
rump state”.55 Thanks to a “well-designed clause”, secession may take place “in accord-
ance with norms of democracy, justice and the rule of law”.56 
Therefore, it is worth wondering, not whether Art. 50 TEU enables withdrawal, but 
how this provision regulates secession from the EU. The next sections analyse the pro-
cedure for withdrawal from the EU, and suggest that Art. 50 constitutes a “well-designed 
secession clause”, for three reasons. In the first place, Art. 50 TEU reinforces the negoti-
ating position of the Union, since it ensures its unity during the negotiations with the 
withdrawing State (section IV). Secondly, Art. 50 introduces considerable restraints to 
the discretion of the departing State, regarding the activation of the withdrawal proce-
dure and its termination (section V). Thirdly, the very possibility of unilateral withdrawal 
foreseen by Art. 50 appears as a constraint for the withdrawing State, rather than an 
advantage (section VI). 
IV. The EU’s unity in withdrawal negotiations 
To promote an orderly secession, and to discourage abuses, “a well-designed secession 
clause” should enable the State – or, in our case, the EU – to negotiate with the depart-
ing sub-unit from a position of force. To achieve this result, the secession clause should 
ensure, first and foremost, the unity of the State (or EU) vis-à-vis the secessionists. 
The unity of the EU’s representation is a notoriously complex problem.57 The EU’s 
representation is usually fragmented on a vertical level, because the Union does not 
possess the plenitude of the foreign relations power.58 The Union cannot adopt acts re-
 
54 W. NORMAN, Negotiating Nationalism, cit., p. 175. 
55 Ibid., p. 180. 
56 Ibid., p. 175. 
57 See Court of Justice, opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, para. 108; opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993, 
para 36; judgment of 19 March 1996, case C-25/94, European Commission v. Council of the European Un-
ion, para. 48; judgment of 2 June 2005, case C-266/03, European Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 60; 
judgment of 14 July 2005, case C-433/03, European Commission v. Germany, para. 66; judgment of 20 
April 2010, case C-246/07, European Commission v. Sweden, paras 87-102. 
58 See E. CANNIZZARO, Unity and Pluralism in the EU’s Foreign Relations Power, in C. BARNARD (ed.), The 
Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited. Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate, Collected Courses 
of the Academy of European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 194. The vertical representa-
tion may be fragmented for other reasons, too, notably the impossibility for the EU to participate in cer-
tain international organizations and the political resistance of certain Member States against the EU’s ac-
torness in multilateral fora; this issue, at any rate, is not relevant in respect of Art. 50. See further J. 
SANTOS VARA, EU Representation to International Organisations: A Challenging Task for the EEAS, in L.N. 
GONZÁLEZ ALONSO (ed.), Between Autonomy and Cooperation: Shaping the Institutional Profile of the Euro-
pean External Action Service, Den Haag: CLEER, 2014, p. 65 et seq. 
Art. 50 TEU: A Well-Designed Secession Clause 169 
garding issues that do not fall within the scope of its competences, and must conse-
quently conduct several international negotiations beside its own Member States.59 This 
problem might be exacerbated during the negotiation of the arrangements for with-
drawal. In the absence of a withdrawal clause in the Treaties, the Union would not have 
any competence to negotiate an agreement in this respect. Hence, the Union would be 
excluded from withdrawal negotiations. As noted in section II, withdrawal from an in-
ternational organisation, in the absence of an explicit or implicit right to unilateral with-
drawal, is possible when approved by all the parties, i.e. the other Member States. The 
negotiation for withdrawal from the Union, therefore, would take place by negotiation 
among the Member States, that is to say, without the EU. Such a multilateral negotiation 
would offer the departing country – especially, a big country – the opportunity to selec-
tively offer benefits to specific Member States, thereby potentially playing one Member 
State against the other and dividing the Union. 
Art. 50 TEU solves this problem. This provision expressly affirms that the withdraw-
ing State must negotiate with the Union. Art. 50 thus ensures that the Member States 
are not directly involved in the negotiations, and prevents the withdrawing country 
from playing a divide-and-rule strategy. To be sure, the Member States can indirectly 
influence the negotiations, by issuing guidelines and directives (via the European Coun-
cil and the Council)60 and overseeing the talks (via Council Working Parties).61 They can-
not, in any event, “bind the negotiator” to a specific strategy or negotiating position.62 
The EU’s representation is often horizontally fragmented, too. The Treaties confer 
the power to represent the EU to a plethora of bodies, including the Commission, the 
High Representative, and the President of the European Council. The multiplication of 
the EU’s representatives would obviously not contribute to the conduct of effective with-
drawal negotiations. Art. 50 TEU solves this problem, as well. This provision stipulates that 
the Union should conduct negotiations “in accordance with Art. 218, para. 3 TFEU”, i.e. the 
negotiating procedure generally applicable to the agreements with third countries. 
 
59 This is the case of the so-called mixed agreements. 
60 European Council, Guidelines EUCO XT 20004/17 of 29 April 2017 following the United Kingdom’s 
notification under Art. 50 TEU (hereinafter, European Council, Draft guidelines following the United King-
dom’s notification); Council doc. XT 21016/17 of 22 May 2017, Directives for the negotiation of an agree-
ment with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal from the European Union (hereinafter, Council Directives for the negotiation of an agreement 
with the United Kingdom). 
61 See Decision 2017/900/EU of the Council of 22 May 2017 concerning the establishment of the ad 
hoc Working Party on Art. 50 TEU chaired by the General Secretariat of the Council. 
62 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 2015, case C-425/13, European Commission v. Council of the 
European union [GC], para. 86; see further ibid., paras 85-93. 
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As noted elsewhere,63 Art. 218, para. 3, read in combination with other Treaty pro-
visions, identifies the EU’s negotiator with precision. The first such provision is Art. 17, 
para. 1, TEU, whereby the EU’s external representation is ensured by the European 
Commission, “with the exception of”: (a) the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
where agreements are negotiated by the High Representative (under Art. 27, para. 2, 
TEU); and (b) “other cases” provided for in the Treaties.64 Art. 218, para. 3, TFEU does 
not provide for any case in which the Commission should not represent the Union. It ra-
ther confirms Art. 17, by stipulating that the Council must nominate the EU’s negotiator 
“depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged”, thereby meaning that the Com-
mission negotiates non-CFSP agreements (ex Art. 17 TEU), while the High Representative 
negotiates CFSP instruments (ex Art. 27 TEU).65 The Court of Justice has upheld this inter-
pretation of the Treaties, by affirming that Art. 218 TFEU, with a view to establishing a bal-
ance between the Commission and the Council, provides that international agreements 
“are to be negotiated by the Commission” and then concluded by the Council.66 
According to several authors, the rules generally applicable to the negotiation of in-
ternational agreements (Arts 218 TFEU and 17 TEU) should not be applicable to with-
drawal negotiations. The political character of this procedure allegedly calls for inter-
governmental mechanisms: withdrawal should be “negotiated only with the Council”,67 
while the role of the Commission should be “minimal”.68 This argument is perhaps un-
derstandable from a political perspective, but does not seem to be legally sound. The 
Commission is conferred a power of representation by Art. 17, para. 1, TEU and limita-
tions to such a power can only come from the wording of the Treaties, and not from 
general principles69 or, a fortiori, from political considerations. 
The Declaration of the Member States of 15 December 2016 confirms the above in-
terpretation of Arts 17 and 50 TEU and 218 TFEU. In that Declaration, EU States “invited” 
the Council to nominate the Commission as the “Union negotiator” (a figure that appar-
ently corresponds to what Art. 218, para. 3, TFEU defines as the “head of the Union's 
 
63 M. GATTI, P. MANZINI, External Representation of the European Union in the Conclusion of Interna-
tional Agreements, in Common Market Law Review, 2012, pp. 1707-1711. 
64 See e.g. Arts 34, para. 1, TEU and 219, para. 3, TFEU. 
65 See further M. GATTI, P. MANZINI, External Representation, cit., p. 1709. 
66 European Commission v. Council of the European Union, case C-266/03, cit., para. 62. 
67 A.F. TATHAM, Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, cit., p. 154. 
68 P. NICOLAIDES, Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects, in Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, 2013, p. 222. See also C. CURTI GIALDINO, Oltre la Brexit: brevi note sulle 
implicazioni giuridiche e politiche per il futuro prossimo dell'Unione europea, in Federalismi.it, 2016, 
www.federalismi.it, p. 20. 
69 Cf. Court of Justice, judgment of 6 July 1982, joined cases 188/80, 189/80 and 190/80, France et al. 
v. European Commission, para. 6. 
Art. 50 TEU: A Well-Designed Secession Clause 171 
negotiating team”).70 The States also welcomed the nomination of Michel Barnier as the 
Commission’s “Chief negotiator”. The Declaration arguably contains a legal imprecision, 
as it stipulates that the negotiating team will have to include a representative of the “ro-
tating presidency of the Council” and that “Representatives of the President of the Eu-
ropean Council” will participate in the negotiation sessions. This arrangement consti-
tutes, in my view, a violation of the Commission’s institutional autonomy: having been 
conferred a power of external representation, the Commission should be free to de-
termine the arrangements for the exercise of that power.71 
This violation of the Commission’s prerogatives, in any case, is unlikely to have a 
dramatic impact on the negotiations. The practice of the EU’s negotiating teams sug-
gests that the “head of the Union's negotiating team” controls the entire negotiation 
and ensures its unity. In several occasions, the Council appointed teams, composed of 
representatives of the High Representative and of the Commission, to negotiate so-
called Framework Agreements with third countries, involving both CFSP elements (to be 
negotiated by the High Representative) and non-CFSP elements (to be negotiated by the 
Commission). The EEAS72 and the Commission Secretariat-General entered into an in-
ter-service arrangement73 – called “Operational Guidelines” – to regulate the conduct of 
negotiating teams in respect of Framework Agreements.74 Pursuant to these guidelines, 
the “Chief negotiator” has authority on the entire team, to the extent that he/she 
“give[s] the floor to the relevant EEAS and Commission experts” during the negotiating 
sessions.75 While the negotiation of the Brexit agreement is not identical to the negotia-
tion of a Framework Agreement,76 it is probably managed in a similar manner: the EU’s 
 
70 Statement after the informal meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government of 15 December 
2016, in European Council Press Release 782/16 of 15 December 2016, para. 3. 
71 See Art. 249, para. 1, TFEU. See also the opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 29 January 2015, 
case C-28/12, European Commission v. Council of the European Union, para. 55. 
72 The EEAS assists the High Representative, see Art. 27, para. 3, TEU. 
73 Probably, these arrangements are not binding, see M. GATTI, European External Action Service: 
Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination, Leiden: Brill, 2016, pp. 198-200, 259-260; M. 
GATTI, Diplomats at the Bar: The European External Action Service before EU Courts, in European Law Re-
view, 2014, pp. 679-680. 
74 Commission Secretariat-General and EEAS, Note for the Attention of Director-Generals and Heads 
of Service: Operational Guidelines for the Preparation and Conduct of Negotiations for Framework 
Agreements with Third Countries Involving Both the European Commission and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). This document is on file with the author, and is 
neither dated nor published in open sources. 
75 See further M. GATTI, European External Action Service, cit., pp. 259-260. 
76 Framework agreements are negotiated by the High Representative and the Commission, while the 
Brexit agreement is negotiated by the Commission and the representatives of the Council and the Euro-
pean Council. Furthermore, one should note that the Framework Agreements addressed by the Opera-
tional Guidelines (see above) are only those whose negotiations are led by the EEAS on behalf of both the 
High Representative and the Commission. The fact remains, at any rate, that the “Operational Guidelines” 
 
172 Mauro Gatti 
“Chief negotiator” presumably leads the whole team. The Declaration of 16 December 
seems to confirm this, since it acknowledges that the representatives of the President 
of the European Council will participate in negotiations merely “in a supporting role”.77 
In summary, the silence of primary law on withdrawal would force the Union to 
speak with 27 voices. Art. 50 TEU ensures that there remains only one: the Chief negoti-
ator of the Commission. 
V. The not-so-unilateral character of withdrawal under Art. 50 TEU 
Art. 50 TEU arguably constitutes a “well-designed secession clause”, not only because it 
allows the EU to speak with one voice, but also because it constrains the discretion of 
the departing State, thereby preventing it from abusing the procedure. In other words, 
the procedure introduced through Art. 50 TEU limits the unilateral character of the 
withdrawal from the Union.78 Section V.1 explores the restrictions to the departing 
State’s discretion relating to the activation of the withdrawal procedure. Section V.2 
analyses the restraints to unilateralism regarding the termination of the procedure. 
v.1. Obligation to promptly activate the withdrawal procedure 
Pursuant to Art. 50 TEU, para. 1, each EU Member may decide to withdraw from the Un-
ion “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. Subsequently, the depart-
ing State should simply “notify” the European Council of its “intention” to open negotia-
tions with the Union, and eventually cease to be an EU Member, either after the conclu-
sion of an agreement with the EU or after two years.79 
At first sight, the departing State seems to enjoy unfettered discretion regarding the 
activation of the withdrawal procedure. This discretion might potentially be used to ex-
ert control on the withdrawal process. One may expect, in particular, that the departing 
State might seek to delay the notification of its intentions to conduct informal negotia-
tions before the formal withdrawal procedure begins. Such a strategy would allow the 
departing State to extend de facto the short negotiation period imposed by Art. 50 
(which plays against the withdrawing state’s interests, as section VI will show). The 
launch of informal negotiations before the notification would also enable the departing 
State to conduct talks with individual Member States, thereby undercutting the EU’s po-
sition in the subsequent formal negotiations.80 
 
clarify the relationship between the “Chief negotiator” and the other members of the negotiating team, 
which is the most relevant element for the purpose of the present analysis. 
77 See Statement after the informal meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government (2016), cit., pa-
ra. 3. 
78 Cf. C. CLOSA, Interpreting Article 50, cit., p. 5. 
79 On the possibility to revoke the notification see infra, section V.2. 
80 Cf. European Council, Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification, cit., para. 2. 
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A closer inspection reveals that the Treaties do not give unfettered discretion to the 
departing State regarding the activation of the withdrawal procedure. According to Art. 
50 TEU, the withdrawing State must (“shall”) notify its intentions to the EU. This notifica-
tion should arguably be performed in a rapid manner. Pursuant to Art. 4, para. 3, TEU, 
the Member States must “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”. Ar-
guably, a delay in the notification would bring about insecurity, which might, in turn, 
prevent the Union from effectively pursuing its objectives, such as maintaining a “stable 
currency”, ensuring the “efficient functioning” of its institutions, or promoting the “well-
being of its peoples”.81 Therefore, if the departing State arbitrarily delayed the notifica-
tion of its decision to withdraw, it would arguably violate Arts 4, para. 3, and 50 TEU.82 
Such a violation of the Treaties can be effectively sanctioned. The Commission may 
initiate an infringement procedure directly against the departing State, though such a 
procedure would only lead to a penalty payment, which might not necessarily force the 
withdrawing State into compliance.83 Recourse to indirect means of enforcement may 
be more effective. The Commission might refuse to negotiate the withdrawal agree-
ment before the departing State notifies its intentions, and may impose similar re-
straints on the Member States, by threatening them with an infringement procedure in 
case they held talks with the departing country. The case law of the CJEU suggests in-
deed that the duty of loyalty, codified in Art. 4, para. 3, TEU, prevents the Member 
States from conducting negotiations in areas covered by EU competences and from dis-
sociating from a “concerted common strategy” defined within the Council”.84 As noted in 
the Council’s negotiating directives for the Brexit withdrawal agreement, Art. 50 confers 
on the Union a “competence to cover in this agreement all matters necessary to ar-
range the withdrawal”.85 Even if that were not the case, Art. 50 would at least enable the 
EU to define a “common strategy” from which EU Member States cannot dissociate 
 
81 See preamble and Art. 3 TEU. 
82 Cf. C. HILLION, Leaving the European Union, the Union Way: A Legal Analysis of Article 50 TEU, in 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) European Policy Analysis, 2016, www.sieps.se, p. 3; 
C. CURTI GIALDINO, Oltre la Brexit, cit., p. 21. 
83 On infringement procedures and Art. 50 TEU, see A. LAZOWSKI, Withdrawal from the European Un-
ion and Alternatives to Membership, in European Law Review, 2012, pp. 531-532. More generally, one 
should note that EU Treaties do not allow the Member States to expel another Member State, not even 
when it violates a primary law provision (such as Art. 4, para. 3, TEU). As repeatedly noted by the CJEU, “a 
Member State cannot, in any circumstances, plead the principle of reciprocity and rely on a possible in-
fringement of the Treaty by another Member State in order to justify its own default”. See Court of Justice, 
judgment of 14 February 1984, case 325/82, European Commission v. Germany, para. 11; cf. P. 
ATHANASSIOU, Withdrawal and Expulsion, cit., pp. 31-38. 
84 See European Commission v. Sweden, cit., paras 87-104; European Commission v. Germany, cit., 
para. 66; European Commission v. Luxembourg, cit., para. 60. 
85 Council Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom, cit., para. 5. 
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themselves. In any event, it seems clear that Art. 50 prevents EU Member States from 
conducting their own negotiations with the withdrawing country. 
Given the possibility of infringement procedures, negotiations between EU coun-
tries and the departing State are unlikely to take place. Therefore, the withdrawing State 
has little interest in delaying the notification ex Art. 50, para. 2. One may argue that, by 
enforcing the duty of loyalty of the other Member States, the Commission may indirect-
ly ensure compliance with the duty of loyalty of the departing country. 
The practice seems to confirm that the departing State is unlikely to gain a negotiat-
ing advantage by strategically delaying the notification under Art. 50. After the Brexit 
referendum (June 2016), the British government delayed the notification of its inten-
tions for an indefinite period, and apparently sought to open informal negotiations with 
EU Members on issues such as the status of EU citizens in the UK.86 The EU and its 
Member States called for an immediate activation of Art. 50, and refused to conduct 
“any negotiation, formal or informal, before we receive a notification”.87 The UK, in the 
hope of convincing the “remaining Members of the EU […] to have some preparatory 
work”, committed to activate Art. 50 before March 2017.88 Even this attempt at stimulat-
ing pre-notification negotiations failed. The UK invoked Art. 50 in March 2017, nine 
months after the Brexit referendum, apparently without having conducted any substan-
tial negotiation with its partners. 
v.2. Absence of a right to unilaterally revoke the notification under 
Art. 50 TEU 
Another restriction to the allegedly unilateral character of Art. 50 concerns the termina-
tion of the withdrawal procedure: once the departing State has invoked Art. 50, it can-
not unilaterally stop the withdrawal process. 
The development of the negotiations might possibly convince the withdrawing State 
that any plausible exit option is in reality worse than continuing to remain in the EU.89 
In this situation, the termination of the withdrawal procedure may seem the better op-
tion. A consensual termination of the withdrawal procedure seems possible: since the 
Union and the withdrawing State may agree to extend the negotiation period, ex Art. 
50, para. 3, TEU, they might also agree upon a sine die extension, that is, a de facto ter-
 
86 UK Government, Policy Paper of 2 February 2017, The United Kingdom’s Exit From and New Part-
nership with the European Union, www.gov.uk, p. 30. 
87 J.-C. JUNCKER, Letter to the Members of the College, 28 June 2016, reported by EU & Democracy, 12 
October 2016, euanddemocracy.ideasoneurope.eu. See also A. MCSMITH, German leaders furious at UK’s 
reluctance to invoke Article 50, in The Independent, 27 June 2016, www.independent.co.uk. 
88 R. MERRICK, Article 50: EU President Rejects Theresa May’s Call for Early Start to Preliminary Brexit 
Negotiations, in The Independent, 2 October 2016, www.independent.co.uk. 
89 P. CRAIG, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts, in European Law Review, 2016, p. 465. 
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mination of the procedure.90 It is to be noted, at any rate, that such a consensual termi-
nation would require approval by unanimity in the European Council, which might not 
be easily obtained. 
It has been argued that the withdrawing state has the right to unilaterally revoke 
the notification of the national decision to withdraw.91 Since the Art. 50 procedure is 
based on the unilateral notification of the national decision to withdraw, the unilateral 
revocation of such a notification may possibly lead to the termination of the withdrawal 
procedure. Some authors have supported this argument by stressing that, pursuant to 
Art. 68 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a State may revoke the notification of its inten-
tion to withdraw from a treaty “at any time before it takes effect”.92 As Art. 50 TEU does 
not expressly exclude the right to unilaterally revoke the notification of the intention to 
withdraw, such a right is allegedly “implicit”.93 Furthermore, it has been noted that the 
conclusion of a withdrawal agreement under Art. 50 TEU requires the consent of the 
departing state, which, during the course of negotiations, may “change its mind and 
withdraw from the exit negotiation”.94 In such a case, there would no longer be a deci-
sion to withdraw within the meaning of Art. 50, para. 1, since “the original decision had 
been changed in accordance with national constitutional requirements”.95 
The existence of a right to unilaterally stop the withdrawal process would affect the 
dynamics of the negotiations: should the withdrawing State be unsatisfied with the deal 
it is offered, it may simply block the process and return to its original status as an EU 
Member. It might even consider re-activating the Art. 50 procedure after a few months, 
or a few years, in the hope of obtaining better conditions. Such a scenario would evi-
dently favour the withdrawing State and would considerably weaken the Union’s posi-
tion. In such a context, any Member State would be “entitled to threaten exit, notify it to 
the European Council, open negotiations under Art. 50, para. 2, and seek to enhance its 
 
90 In principle, it is possible to argue that “the logic and context of Art. 50 suggests that extensions of 
the time limit are temporary”, see S. PEERS, Article 50 TEU: The uses and Abuses of the Process of With-
drawing from the EU, in EU Law Analysis, 8 December 2016, eulawanalysis.blogspot.it. One may doubt, 
however, whether such a restrictive interpretation of Art. 50 would prevail in practice once all EU Member 
States had agreed to terminate the withdrawal procedure. 
91 See, inter alia, A. YOUNG, Brexit, Article 50 and the “Joys” of a Flexible, Evolving, Un-codified Consti-
tution, in P. ELEFTHERIADIS (ed.), Legal Aspects of Withdrawal from the EU: A Briefing Note, in University of 
Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, no. 47, 2016, p. 21; D. WYATT, Supplementary written evidence to the 
UK Parliament, March 2016, data.parliament.uk, para. 2. 
92 Arts 67 and 68 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, cit. 
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CLOSA, Is Article 50 Reversible? On Politics Beyond Legal Doctrine, in Verfassungsblog, 4 January 2017, ver-
fassungsblog.de; A. SARI, Biting the Bullet: Why the UK Is Free to Revoke Its Withdrawal Notification under 
Article 50 TEU, in UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 17 October 2016, ukconstitutionallaw.org. 
94 P. CRAIG, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts, cit., p. 464 
95 Ibid. 
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position within the Union by using ‘strategically’ the withdrawal option”.96 The right to 
unilaterally terminate the withdrawal procedure might thus stimulate recourse to Art. 
50 and the disintegration of the EU. 
However, it would not seem that Art. 50 provides for a right to unilaterally revoke 
the notification of the intention to withdraw from the Union. Art. 50 affirms that the 
withdrawal process may terminate in two manners: the parties may conclude a with-
drawal agreement, or, “failing that”, withdrawal is automatic after two years. In both 
cases, the procedure ends with the withdrawal of the departing Member State. Art. 50 
consequently implies that withdrawal is the only natural outcome of the procedure. 
Such an interpretation of Art. 50 is corroborated by the duty to cooperate in good faith, 
enshrined in Art. 4, para. 3, TEU.97 It would indeed be impossible to conduct withdrawal 
negotiations in good faith if one of the parties could threaten to terminate them when-
ever they lead in a direction it does not approve.98 
Since the withdrawal from the EU is regulated by Art. 50 TEU (lex specialis), and that 
provision never acknowledges the right to unilaterally terminate the procedure, it ap-
pears inappropriate to postulate the implicit existence of such a right on the basis of 
international law (lex generalis). Even assuming that Art. 68 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion corresponds to international customary law (which is not certain),99 one might use 
it to fill a gap in the Art. 50 procedure only if such a gap existed, which is not the case. 
Art. 50 provides for a clear and complete procedural path. Firstly, a Member State de-
cides to withdraw (para. 1) and notifies its intention to withdraw (para. 2). Then, (i) it 
concludes a withdrawal agreement with the EU, and it withdraws from the Union or (ii) 
it does not conclude a withdrawal agreement and, after two years, it withdraws from 
the Union (para. 3). As EU Treaties do not offer a third option, one should probably re-
frain from postulating its existence on the basis of an uncertain international custom. 
Unilateral termination of the procedure remains impossible, in my opinion, not-
withstanding the possible change in the domestic decision of the withdrawing country. 
It is not the decision to withdraw that starts the withdrawal process, but the notification 
of such a decision. Once the decision has been notified, the procedure starts. A subse-
quent change in the national decision does not affect the previous notification and, 
consequently, cannot stop the withdrawal procedure. 
 
96 F. MUNARI, You Can’t Have Your Cake and Eat it Too: Why the UK Has No Right To Revoke Its Pro-
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97 See, in particular, European Commission v. Sweden, cit., para. 77; Court of Justice, judgment of 27 
February 2007, case C-355/04, Segi and Others v. Council of the European Union [GC], para. 52. 
98 See, to that effect, F. MUNARI, You Can’t Have Your Cake and Eat it Too, cit. 
99 Cf. T. TZANAKOPOULOS, Article 56, 1969 Vienna Convention, in O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN (eds), The Vienna 
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A unilateral termination of the Art. 50 procedure would remain impossible even if 
the change of heart of the withdrawing State were determined by a referendum. It has 
been argued that, in such a scenario, “the EU would not wish to be forced to push out of 
the door a state that had bona fide changed its mind”.100 Yet, one should stress that a 
consensual termination of withdrawal procedures would always remain possible: the 
departing State and the other EU Members may always agree (by unanimity) to stop the 
withdrawal process. The necessity to reach an agreement with all EU Members would 
constitute an obstacle for the withdrawing State, but there seems to be nothing shock-
ing in the idea that a Member State, which is not forced to activate the withdrawal pro-
cedure, may have difficulty blocking it.101 
In fact, the democracy principle cannot be invoked to trump the principle of equali-
ty, the rights of individuals, or the operation of democracy in the other Member States 
or in the EU as a whole.102 The withdrawal process requires “the reconciliation of vari-
ous rights and obligations by negotiation between two legitimate majorities”:103 the ma-
jority of the population of the withdrawing State and that of the EU as a whole. The con-
cern for democracy may require the departing State to respect the will of the majority 
of its population, even when it is inconstant, but it cannot force other States to do the 
same. The mere invocation of Art. 50 TEU is likely to bring about instability, which po-
tentially harms the interests of the entire EU population. It seems reasonable that the 
departing state should negotiate some form of compensation for the disruption it caused. 
VI. Unilateral withdrawal from the EU: right or risk? 
The last reason why Art. 50 TEU constitutes a “well-designed secession clause” is proba-
bly the most important and – paradoxically – it coincides with the reason why this provi-
sion has been so fiercely criticised: the possibility of unilateral withdrawal. 
Pursuant to Art. 50, paras 2 and 3, TEU, after the notification, the Union “shall nego-
tiate and conclude an agreement” with the departing State. EU Treaties cease to apply 
to the departing State “from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement” 
or, failing that, “two years after the notification”. This means that the departing State 
might allegedly invoke Art. 50 and hold “the threat of withdrawal over the EU”, knowing 
that after two years “withdrawal will take effect in any event”.104 Seen from this perspec-
tive, Art. 50 TEU may look like Art. 1 of the League of Nations’ Covenant, which enabled 
any Member State to withdraw after two years’ notice of its intention so to do. This read-
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ing of Art. 50, which is essentially the one espoused by the German Constitutional Court in 
the judgment on the Lisbon Treaty, truly “underlines the Member States’ sovereignty”.105 
At first sight, the practice may seem to confirm that Art. 50 emphasises the sover-
eignty of the Member States. According to Theresa May, if the EU failed to accommo-
date the British requests, the UK would pursue unilateral withdrawal, without conclud-
ing any withdrawal agreement with the Union: “no deal for Britain is better than a bad 
deal for Britain”.106 This scenario is usually referred to as “Hard Brexit”. However, the 
credibility of UK’s threat is questionable. The withdrawal agreement is expected to pro-
vide for “transitional or interim arrangements to mitigate the shock” that would follow a 
Hard Brexit.107 For instance, the withdrawal agreement might provide for “a time-
limited prolongation of Union acquis”,108 which may remain in force until the Union 
concludes a trade agreement with the UK. A Hard Brexit would prevent the establish-
ment of any transitional arrangement in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Therefore, 
post-Brexit EU-UK trade would be regulated by the rules of the WTO: trade in goods 
would be likely to face “significant tariffs” and trade in services would be subject to “much 
greater restrictions”.109 Such restrictions would be particularly problematic for the UK. As 
noted by the British government before the referendum, “a considerably larger propor-
tion of the UK economy is dependent on the EU than vice versa. […] Taken as a share of 
the economy, only 3.1 per cent of GDP among the other 27 Member States is linked to 
exports to the UK, while 12.6 per cent of UK GDP is linked to exports to the EU”.110 
If the negotiations between the EU and the departing State could last indefinitely – 
which would be the case in the absence of Art. 50 – the problem of a hard withdrawal 
would never materialise. The withdrawing State might simply continue the negotiations 
until it reaches a favourable result; unilateral withdrawal would remain a threat to be 
used only in extreme cases. However, Art. 50 TEU imposes a deadline to withdrawal ne-
gotiations: two years. This time limit is very short, considering that the negotiations 
concern sensitive issues, such as the status of EU citizens in the departing country. 
Moreover, one should note that the negotiators are likely to need a long time to reach a 
compromise that satisfies the departing State, a majority of EU governments (which 
must approve the agreement in the Council),111 as well as a majority of European Par-
liament members. To be sure, Art. 50 TEU allows for an extension of the negotiating 
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time, but subordinates such an extension to an onerous condition: a unanimous deci-
sion of the European Council, approved by the departing State. 
Art. 50 TEU thus places the departing State in an uncomfortable position: either it 
swiftly reaches a compromise with the EU, or it risks a hard withdrawal, which would be 
particularly negative for its economy and society. The vulnerability of the departing 
State may therefore have “an impact on the dynamic of the negotiations”, as recognised 
by the British government:112 having greater interest in a swift conclusion of the with-
drawal agreement, the departing State is likely to make significant concessions to the EU. 
The practice seems to confirm this reading of Art. 50 TEU. The UK delayed the acti-
vation of Art. 50 for nine months, ostensibly because of a concern for timing issues. 
Theresa May made this clear in September 2016, by affirming that “we shouldn’t invoke 
Art. 50 immediately […] because when we hit Art. 50, when we invoke that, the process 
at the EU level starts. They say that that could take up to two years”.113 The behaviour of 
EU institutions and Member States further confirms that the time limit of Art. 50 plays 
against the interests of the departing State: they demanded a swift activation of Art. 50, 
and resolutely refused to conduct any negotiation before Art. 50 was invoked (see 
above, section V.1). 
Therefore, it would seem that the unilateral character of the Art. 50 procedure 
should be put into perspective.114 From a purely formalistic viewpoint, this provision 
enables unilateral secession, thereby underlining the Member States’ sovereignty and 
potentially promoting the EU’s disintegration. A more realistic assessment permits to 
see Art. 50 in a different light. Unilateral withdrawal, rather than a right, appears as a 
risk for the departing State. By threatening a hard withdrawal, Art. 50 de facto compels 
the departing State to negotiate and compromise, thereby ensuring that the withdrawal 
process addresses the interests of the entire Union, and not only those of the departing 
State. The risk of unilateral withdrawal may thus paradoxically discourage careless re-
course to the right to unilateral withdrawal in the future. 
VII. Conclusion: a well-designed secession clause 
Art. 50 TEU has been criticised in the literature and in the public debate because it al-
legedly grants EU Member States an unfettered right to unilateral withdrawal, which 
questions the EU’s quasi-federal character and fosters its disintegration.115 This On the 
Agenda demonstrates that Art. 50 TEU plays the opposite function, since it ensures an 
orderly withdrawal process and discourages casual recourse to secession. 
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The analysis suggests that the widespread pessimistic view of Art. 50 is based on a 
formalistic reading of this provision, which focuses on the abstract possibility of unilat-
eral withdrawal. From this perspective, Art. 50 TEU might truly appear as a challenge for 
the EU’s federal aspirations and for its very survival. However, this formalistic approach 
divorces law from reality. Secession (from States) and withdrawal (from international 
organisations) is always possible de facto: the relevant question is whether constitu-
tional provisions, such as Art. 50, permit (or not) a good management of the secession 
process and whether they discourage (or not) casual recourse to secession. 
This contribution suggests that Art. 50 promotes an orderly withdrawal from the 
Union, since it ensures the EU’s unity in withdrawal negotiations, limits the discretion of 
the departing State, and induces it to reach a compromise with the Union. Unilateral 
withdrawal from the EU is possible, but is also discouraged. Art. 50 may thus function as 
a “safety valve” for European integration:116 when the pressure (of Euroscepticism) rises 
too high, the withdrawal of a Member State enables the Union to release some steam in 
a controlled manner, thereby reducing the risk of explosions. 
Art. 50 arguably ensures a fair balance between the concern for the EU’s integrity 
and the principles that inspire European integration. In a federal and democratic Union, 
“the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession” by the population of a State 
must “give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate 
constitutional changes to respond to that desire”.117 The very possibility of secession 
from the Union may potentially contribute to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU, 
and reinforce its legitimacy: Art. 50 makes clear that the membership of the Union is 
now a choice, not a necessity. 
The design of Art. 50, while generally satisfactory, was probably not thought out in 
detail, and remains imperfect. Ideally, this provision should be more precise. It should, 
in particular, define a deadline for the invocation of withdrawal (see above, section 
V.1)118 and expressly prohibit the unilateral termination of the procedure (see section 
V.2). These flaws, however, do not prevent Art. 50 from functioning as a “well-designed 
secession clause” that “discourages secessionist resentment”, while allowing for with-
drawal “in accordance with norms of democracy, justice and the rule of law”.119 There-
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fore, a revision of Art. 50 TEU may perhaps be desirable, but does not appear indispen-
sable at present. 
One cannot exclude that Art. 50, despite the criticism it received, may inspire the 
drafting of other secession clauses at the national level. Democratic States find it in-
creasingly difficult to deny demands for independence backed by public opinion, and 
are hard pressed to prevent populous or rich seceding regions from exploiting their 
greater bargaining power in the context of secession negotiations.120 To address this 
problem, States might search for inspiration at the international level. Art. 50 TEU, in 
particular, provides for elements that national constitutions may consider importing,121 
such as unity in withdrawal negotiations (see above, section IV) or the temporal delimi-
tation of withdrawal procedures (section VI). As States experience increasing centrifugal 
forces, formalistic differences from the EU, including the right to secession, may turn 
out to be less important than substantive similarities, such as the need to ensure a 
proper balance between the principles of integrity, federalism, and democracy. 
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